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CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-DuE

PROCEss-LIBERTY

INTEREST

IN FOSTER FAMILIES REQUIRES CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION

v. Organization of Fos
ter Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
IN CHILD REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS-Smith

1.

INTRODUCTION

Theoretically, the purpose of foster care is to provide a tem
porary family environment for children who have been either vol
untarilyl or involuntarily2 separated from their own families. 3 The
courts have traditionally viewed the biological parent-child relation
ship as the paramount interest in child placement decisions. This.
approach has made them reluctant to recognize any rights in the
foster parents which might interfere with the reunion of the child
and his natural family. 4
Although not by design, foster care now consists mostly of long
term placements,5 which often lead to the development of strong

1. See In the Child's Best Interests: Rights of the Natural Parents in Child
Placement Proceedings, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 446, 456 (1976) [hereinafter cited as In the
Child's Best Interests]. Voluntary foster care occurs when the parents are unable or
unwilling to give their children proper care due to phYSical, emotional, or economical
conditions and offer to temporarily tum over custody of the child to an authorized
agency of the state. Each state authorizes a variety of agencies to determine the
placement of foster children. For purposes of this article, a general reference to "the
state" will be used in place of the full name of the particular agency involved.
2. Child "neglect" proceedings are instituted by the state for the protection of
the child who has not received adequate care from his or her natural parents. Statutes
calling for court intervention on behalf of the children do so for a variety of reasons
including "abandonment, physical abuse, inadequate parenting, sexual abuse, failure
to provide medical care and immoral or unconventional conduct." Wald, State Inter
vention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standard for Removal of Children
From Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care and Tennina
tion of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 623, 629 (1976) (footnote omitted).
3. Foster care is theoretically a temporary arrangement providing benefits of a
family environment to the child rather than placement in an institution. Katz, Legal
Aspects of Foster Care, 5 FAM. L.Q. 283, 285 (1971).
4. In the Child's Best Interests, supra note 1, at 448. Scarpetta v. Spence
Chapin Adoption Service, 28 N.Y.2d 185, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65, 269 N.E.2d 787 (1971);
People ex rei. Kropp v. Shepsky, 305 N.Y. 465, 469, 113 N.E.2d 801, 804 (1953). At
least one court has held that too much love between the foster parent and child is
detrimental to the child's welfare because it interferes with the child's relationship
with his natural parents. In re Jewish Child Care Ass'n, 5 N.Y.2d 222, 183 N.Y.S.2d
65, 156 N.E.2d 700 (1959). See also State ex reI. Wallace v. Lhotan, 51 App. Div. 2d
252,380 N.Y.S.2d 250, appeal dismissed, 384 N.Y.S.2d 1030 (1976).
5. Katz, supra note 3, at 301. See Organization of Foster Families for Equality
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emotional ties between the foster parent and the foster child. As a
result, many courts now recognize that when close relationships
have developed, the uprooting of the child from his foster home
may have harmful effects on the child's well-being. 6 This recogni
tion is based on the notion that it is important to the child's de
velopment to become attached to a psychological parent7 and that
under certain circumstances it may be best for the child if the fos
ter parent fills that role. Consequently, an increasing number of
courts now give a great deal of weight to the length of time a child
has spent with a single foster family as they consider which type of
placement will be in the best interests of the child. 8
In addition to having become an important element in place
ment decisions, the strength of the foster relationship and its effect
on the foster child have given rise to the recognition that certain
constitutional safeguards must be available to protect the foster
family from an arbitrary and damaging separation. This note will
analyze the rights that have been created in the foster family,

& Reform v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277, 279 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) [hereinafter cited
as OFFER v. Dumpsonl. In San Diego County, "[nlot only were almost half the chil
dren in placement for 5 years or more, but for a great majority of the children the
long-term plan consisted of continued foster care or no plan whatsoever." Comment,
The Foster Parents Dilemma "Who Can I Tum to When Somebody Needs Me?," 11
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 376, 390 (1974) [hereinafter cited as The Foster Parents Dilem
mal. Some reasons for the trend toward long-term placement include:
1) failure to rehabilitate natural parents to the point of caring for their own
children; 2) inability to terminate parental rights preliminary to adoption; 3)
lack of potential adoptive parents for black, Spanish-American, Indian and
other minority group children, and the increasing number of these children
adjuged un-cared for and therefore made wards of the state; 4) lack of po
tential adoptive parents for older or mentally retarded or physically disabled
children, and the increasing number of these children abandoned to the care
of the state; 5) overburdened caseloads of governmental child welfare agen
cies, causing a corresponding decrease in the resources and time available to
find a qualified adoptive home for a foster child.
Pearlman, Foster Parents' Rights in Connecticut, 5 CONN. L. REv. 36, 37-38 (1972)
(footnote omitted).
6. See generally OFFER v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277, 283 (S.D. N.Y. 1976); In
re Kim Marie J., 398 N.Y.S.2d 374 (App. Div. 1977); In re J., 57 App. Div. 2d 568,
393 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1977); The Foster Parents Dilemma, supra note 5, at 379-80.
7. See, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST IN
. TERESTS OF THE CHILD 18 (1973) [hereinafter cited as GOLDSTEINl.
8. "The best interests rule implicitly recognizes that each child is unique and
that, ideally, the court should give primary regard to the child's individual needs."
In the Child's Best Interests, supra note 1, at 449. Where extraordinary cir
cumstances are present the best interests of the child may be considered always
superior to parental custody. See Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 387 N.Y.S.2d
821,356 N.E.2d 277 (1976).
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focusing upon the procedural safeguards to which the foster family
may be entitled in a proceeding for the removal of the foster child
in light of the recent Supreme Court decision, Smith v. Organiza
tion of Foster Families for Equality & Reform. 9
II.

SMITH V. OFFER

Three individual foster families 10 and the Organization of
Foster Families for Equality and Reform brought a class action
for injunctive and declaratory relief against state and local govern
ment officials and the executive director of the Catholic Guardian
Society who together were responsible for administering the fos
ter care system. The action challenged New York Social Services
Law § 383(2)11 which specifically authorizes discretionary agency
removal of the child from her foster home; section 40012 which
provides the aggrieved foster parents with a post-removal "fair hear
ing"; and New York Code Rules and Regulations § 450.14,13 which
9. 431 U.S. 816 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Smith v. OFFER], rev'g OFFER v.
Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
10. The situations of the three families involved here are typical of the prob
lems brought on by the long-term trend of foster care. In all three cases the children
had lived with their respective foster families for a long time and deep emotional
attachments had developed despite the ever-present threat of agency removal.
OFFER v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277, 279-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
11. N.Y. Soc. SERVo LAW § 383(2) (McKinney 1976) provides:
The custody of a child placed out or boarded out and not legally
adopted or for whom legal guardianship has not been granted shall be
vested during his minority, or until discharged by such authorized agency
from its care and supervision, in the authorized agency placing.out or board
ing out such child and any such authorized agency may in its discretion
remove such child from the home where placed or boarded.
12. N.Y. Soc. SERVo LAw § 400 (McKinney 1976) provides:
1. When any child shall have been placed in an institution or in a fam
ily home by a commissioner of public welfare or a city public welfare officer
the commissioner or public welfare officer may remove such child from such
institution or family home and make such disposition of such child as is
provided by law.
2. Any person aggrieved by such decision of the commissioner of public
welfare or city welfare officer may appeal to the department, which upon
receipt of the appeal shall review the case, shall give the person making the
appeal an opportunity for fair hearing thereon and within thirty days render
its decision. The department may also, on its own motions, review any such
decision made by the public welfare official. The department may make
such additional investigation as it may deem necessary. All decisions of the
department shall be binding upon the public welfare district involved and
shall be complied with by the public welfare officials thereof.
13. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 450.14 (1976) has been renumbered § 450.10 and now pro
vides:
Removal from foster family care.
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provides for a pre-removal conference with a social services offi
cial. 14 The plaintiffs claimed that the statutes violated both the
equal protection15 and due process clauses of the fourteenth amend
ment because they authorize removal of foster children from their
foster homes without a prior hearing for either the foster parent or
the foster child. These procedures, the plaintiffs contended, de
prived them of a specific liberty interest without due process: the
(a) Whenever a social services official of another authorized agency act
ing on his behalf proposes to remove a child in foster family care from the
foster family home, he or such other authorized agency, as may be approp
riate, shall notify the foster family parents, in writing of the intention to
remove such child at least 10 days prior to the proposed effective date of
such removal, except where the health or safety of the child requires that he
be removed immediately from the foster family home. Such notification shall
further advise the foster family parents that they may request a conference
with the social services official or a designated employee of his social ser
vices department at which time they may appear, with or without a rep
resentative to have the proposed action reviewed, be advised of the reasons
therefore and be afforded an opportunity to submit reasons why the child
should not be removed. Each social services official shall instruct and re
quire any authorized agency acting on his behalf to furnish notice in accor
dance with the provisions of this section. Fqster parents who do not object
to the removal of the child from their home may waive in writing their right
to the IO-day notice, provided, however, that such waiver shall not be exe
cuted prior to the social services official's determination to remove th'e child
from the foster home and notifying the foster parents thereof.
(b) Upon the receipt of a request for such conference, the social services
official shall set a time and place for such conference to be held within 10
days of receipt of such request and shall send written notice of such confer
ence to the foster family parents and their representative, if any, and to the
authorized agency, if any, at least five days prior to the date of such confer
ence.
(c) The social services official shall render and issue his decision as ex
peditiously as possible but not later than five days after the conference and
shall send a written notice of his decision to the foster family parents and
their representative, if any, and to the authorized agency, if any. Such deci
sion shall advise the foster family parents of their right to appeal to the
department and request a fair hearing in accordance with section 400 of the
Social Services Law.
(d) In the event there is a request for a conference, the child shall not
be removed from the foster family home until at least three days after the
notice of decision is sent, or prior to the proposed effective date of removal,
whichever occurs later.
(e) In any agreement for foster care between a social services official or
another authorized agency acting on his behalf and foster parents, there shall
be contained therein a statement of a foster parent's rights provided under
this section.
14. The sufficiency of these provisions under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment will be discussed in section IV infra.
15. The equal protection argument was not considered by the district court in
its decision, and will not be discussed in this note.

1978]

NOTES

243

right of family privacy which encompasses the right of the foster
family to remain free from arbitrary state interference. 1s They
argued that "the foster home is entitled to the same constitutional
deference as that long granted to the more traditional biological
£.
ily. "17
lam
Although the district court found debate of this concept in
teresting and important, it declined to decide the case on such a
broad basis. 18 Instead, the court found that a right in the nature of
a liberty interest existed in the foster child, who is entitled "to be
heard before being 'condemned to suffer grievous loss.' "19 The
court reasoned that in this type of case "the harmful consequences
of a precipitous and perhaps improvident decision to remove a
child from his foster family are apparent. "20 On this basis, the dis
trict court held, in a 2-1 decision, that the New York statutes were
constitutionally defective. The court stated that before a child can
be removed from the foster home in which he has been living, he
must be provided with a hearing in which all interested parties
may present any relevant information before an administrative offi
cial who has the power to determine the child's future place
ment. 21 The court indicated, however, that a full trial-type hearing
i.s not a constitutional requisite. 22
16. 418 F. Supp. at 279.
17. ld. at 281 (footnote omitted). The plaintiffs based their contentions on the
concept of the foster family as a psychological entity, and on several decisions of the
Supreme Court which they believed represented a "willingness to look behind legal
formalities when inquiring into the existence of a fruitful family life." ld. (footnote
omitted). These contentions will be discussed in greater depth in section III infra.
18. ld. at 282.
19. ld. (citing Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). The court reached this conclusion by determin
ing children to be "persons" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment
whose rights are entitled to protection from state abridgment. See Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
20. 418 F. Supp. at 283.
21. ld. at 282. Judge Pollack, dissenting, contended that although it may be
wise to afford the foster child the right to be heard, it has not been established that
increased procedural protection is necessary to "impede judgments reasonably
reached by concerned independent disinterested agencies and professionals by less
starchy methods." ld. at 291.
22. The opinion called for certain minimum procedural protections for any
child who has been in a foster home for one year or more. These procedures demand
an automatic pre-removal agency hearing at which the child or an adult representa
tive of the child may participate. The court also indicated that the hearing should be
before an uninvolved officer who has no prior knowledge of the case. The court also
required the participation of all interested parties, including the foster parents, the
natural parents, and the lI:gency in addition to the introduction of any relevant evi
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On direct appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the district
court's holding, finding that a liberty interest requiring stringent
due process safeguards did not exist in the foster child. 23 However,
the majority did recognize the existence of a liberty interest in the
foster family; the right to family privacy.24 In the Supreme Court's
view, "biological relationships are not the exclusive determination
of the existence of the family . . ." and "the importance of the fa
milial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society,
stems from ... the intimacy of daily association, and from the role
it plays in 'promot[ing] a way of life' through the instruction of chil
dren, as well as from the fact of blood relationship. "25 The Court
realized that the increased length of foster care often leads to the
development of deep family attachments in the foster home that
should be afforded protection from unjustified state interference.
The extension of a liberty interest to the foster family implicitly ac
cepts the conclusion of studies that emphasize the need to protect
dence which might have a bearing on the outcome of the case. Id. at 286. Unless
otherwise noted, any discussion of the rights of the foster children, foster parents, or
foster family to a hearing or to the constitutional safeguards necessary to protect their
interests, will be made in reference to the above procedures.
23. Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816, 840-41 (1977). The Court determined that
finding a liberty interest in the foster child does not activate due process protections
without a further showing that the liberty interest is of such dimension as to require
these protections.
24. The Supreme Court has increasingly recognized that the biological family
has certain inherent rights which cannot be arbitrarily invaded by state action. The
plaintiff's claim of a right to foster family privacy in the instant case was based on
this notion. 418 F. Supp. at 279, 281. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923),
the Court recognized that a person's liberty interest includes the right to establish a
home and bring up children. Subsequently, the Court struck down an Oregon stat
ute, finding that it unreasonably interfered with the rights of parents and guardians
to direct the upbringing of the children under their control. Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925). The express inclusion of guardians in the class of
persons protected in that case suggests that the Court might be willing to go beyond
the biological parents in finding a liberty interest. The Court has found that there is
a private realm of family life which the state cannot enter. Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); see also Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632, 639 (1974). This private realm specifically includes the care, custody, manage
ment, and companionship of one's children. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533
(1953). In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,653 (1972), the Court recognized a liberty
interest in the father of an illegitimate child who demanded due process protections to
prevent his child from automatically becoming a ward of the state. These cases in
dicate the extent of the Court's recognition of the fundamental importance of the
family relationship and the rights of the parents to control the development of their
children. To protect these rights the Court has acknowledged the existence of a
liberty interest in the biological family which requires commensurate due process
protections.
25. 431 U.S. at 843-44 (citations omitted).
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positive psychological relationships created by child placements in
foster care. 26 Those psychoanalytic studies have established "the
need of every child for unbroken continuity of affectionate and stim
ulating relationships with an adult. "27
Although the Supreme Court recognized the existence of a
liberty interest in the foster family, the majority reasoned that the
foster parent's contract with the state, which grants the agency dis
cretion to terminate the foster care relationship, limits that inter
est. 28 The Court also found that when the child is removed from
the foster home and returned to the natural parents, the liberty
interest in the foster family must be severely curtailed by the com
peting and dominant interest of the natural parents. 29 The Court
concluded that the magnitude of the appellee's "liberty interest"
was insufficient to support the holding of the district court because
the New York removal procedures were more than adequate to
protect any such interest. 30
The Supreme Court's reasons for limiting the magnitude of the
liberty interest were not entirely persuasive. Although provisions in
the placement agreements grant the agency the discretion to termi
nate the foster care arrangements, courts are increasingly willing
to limit the scope of agency discretion when the welfare of the
child would suffer as a result of a removal decision. 31 In addition,
the Supreme Court's observation that the interest of the natural
parents is predominant does not bear directly on the problem,
since most removals are made to place the child in another foster
home. 32 As the district court pointed out, granting the foster family
increased protection by providing a full hearing is not "intended in
any way to impede the right of biological parents to regain custody
of their children. "33 The district court went on to explain that by

26. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7. This study has emerged as one of the
leading authorities in the area of child placement and is frequently cited in recent
judicial decisions.
27. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 6.
28. 431 U.S. at 845-46.
29. [d.
30. [d. The basis for the holding of the Supreme Court is discussed in greater
depth infra notes 84-99 and accompanying text.
31. When the parental rights doctrine was dominant, the contractual rights were
strongly upheld; however, as the rights of foster parents have increased, the impor
tance of such contracts has diminished. Bodenheimer, New Trends and Require
ments in Adoption Law and Proposals for Legislative Change, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 10,
35-41 (1975).
32. 431 U.S. at 829 n.23.
33. 418 F. Supp. at 283. One court has suggested that the courts must treat any
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providing for such constitutional safeguards, the agency has the
benefit of an "organized forum" within which information may be
more efficiently and effectively gathered, thereby promoting a de
cision that will serve the interests of the child. 34 The willingness of
the Supreme Court to recognize the existence of a liberty interest
in the foster family may in the long run prove more Significant than
the limitations it placed on that interest, since lower courts may
not give such great weight to limiting circumstances in future
cases.
III.

FINDING SPECIFIC LIBERTY INTERESTS
WITHIN THE FOSTER FAMILY

The Supreme Court's opinion recognized only the liberty
interest in the foster family generally. It specifically rejected the
district court's finding of a liberty interest in the foster child and
did not directly discuss the rights of foster parents. Rights of the
foster parents and foster children have, however, been specifically
recognized in many jurisdictions. Recognition of these rights has
allowed courts to afford the foster family important safeguards
against an unjustified separation.
A.

Rights of the Foster Parents

The recognition of rights in the foster parent has been increas
ing in a number of states. One court has noted that:
[tlhere is no sound reason to deny a 'person who has voluntarily
assumed the obligations of parenthood over a child the same
basic rights to due process a natural or legal parent possesses
when the state intervenes to disrupt or destroy the family unit.
"The policy of our law has always been to encourage family rela
tionships, even those foster in character. "35

One leading authority has proposed that it is the "psychological"
and not the "biological" parent who represents the important rela
tionship in a child's development. 36 This proposition has received

action involving an agency removal of a foster child equally, whether the removal is
made to place the child in another foster home or to return him to his biological
parents. In re W., 77 Misc. 2d 374, 376, 355 N.Y.S.2d 245, 249 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County
1974).
34. Id. See note 22 supra.
35. James v. McLinden, 341 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (D. Conn. 1969) (quoting
Banks v. United States, 267 F.2d 535, 539 (2d Cir. 1959».
36. Such a relationship is the product of emotional attachment resulting "from
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increasing support from the courtS. 37 In California, for instance,
where the state had traditionally been given broad discretion and
the foster parents limited rights,38 the courts have begun to treat
the foster parents as de facto custodians, entitling them to "appear
as parties to assert and protect their own interest in the companion
ship, care, custody and management of the child."39 It is now
considered important to have the de facto parents present at the
hearing to aid the court in reaching a proper decision, since "the
views of such persons who have experienced close day-to-day con
'tact with the child deserve consideration; moreover, an award of
custody to such de facto parents is often among the alternate dis
positions which the court must evaluate. "40 In Pennsylvania, foster
parents have been granted the right to petition for custody of their
foster children in order to prevent removal of the children from the
foster home. 41 Foster parents have also been given the right to a
pre-removal administrative hearing when agency removal of the
foster children in their care is sought.42 In Connecticut, it has been
held that the foster parents have no right to initiate a hearing prior
to removal, under a statute that entitled certain parties to revoke

day to day attention to his needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection,
and stimulation." GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 17. It is now often recognized that "a
de facto custodial interest develops in a foster parent when the foster relationship
continues over a period of time." Katz, supra note 3, at 286.
37. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Services, 547
F.2d 835, 853 (5th Cir. 1977). See Ross v. Hoffman, 33 Md. App. 333, 364 A.2d 596
(1976), modified on other grounds, 372 A.2d 582 (1977); Cennami v. Dep't of Public
Welfare, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 687, 363 N.E.2d 539 (1977).
38. See The Foster Parents Dilemma, supra note 5, at 398-406.
39. In re B.G., 11 Cal. App. 3d 679, 693, 523 P.2d 244, 254, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444,
. 454 (1974) (footnote omitted). See also Katzoff v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. App. 3d
1079, 127 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1976).
40. Katzoff v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1079, 1084, 127 Cal. Rptr. 178,
180 (1976).
41. Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Services, 228 Pa. Super. 371, 324
A.2d 562 (1974). For an analysis of this decision, see Note, Increasing the Rights of
Foster Parents, 36 U. PITT. L. REV. 715 (1975).
42. This regulation affords the foster parents an informal pre-removal hearing
with the executive director of the agency, at which both the agency and the foster
parents are permitted to question all testimony and evidence presented. PA. DEP'T
OF PUBLIC WELFARE, CHILDREN AND YOUTH MANUAL, tit. 4300, §§ 4360-4363, 5 Pa.
Bull. No. 34, 2032-34 (August 9, 1975). Under this provision, the foster parents also
have the right to a pre-removal appeal in accordance with the Administrative Agency
Law, at which they are entitled to counsel. Id. These administrative hearings provide
for the introduction of all relevant evidence and reasonable examination and cross
examination. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11305 (Purdon 1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,
§ 1710.32 (Purdon 1962).
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the commitment of minor children to the welfare commissioner. 43
A strong dissent, however, would have allowed the foster parents
to participate under the statute in question reasoning that recent
decisions have "blurred the distinction between rights of natural
parents and the rights of foster parents in this area. "44 Some courts
will now balance equally the foster parents' right to custody of the
child with the rights of the natural parents. 45
Further evidence of the expansion of foster parents' rights can
be found in their increasing ability to adopt children in their care.
The difficulty of finding adoptive homes for certain children and
the notion that many children eventually regard the foster family as
their own have led some states to encourage foster parents to adopt
their foster children in certain situations. 46 The recognition of rela
tive equality of rights between the foster and natural parents has
resulted in situations in which the foster parents have been held
entitled to custody of the child even over a natural parent who was
not first judged to be unfit. 47
Despite the trend towards the recognition of some degree of

43. Eason v. Welfare Comm'r, 171 Conn. 630, 370 A.2d 1082 (1976).
44. Id. at 1087 (Longo, J., dissenting). See Borsdorf v. Mills, 49 Ala. App. 658,
275 So. 2d 338 (1973). The court noted that "[tlhe bonds of love between parent
and child are not dependent upon blood relation and instinct, but may be forged
as strongly in the crucible of day to day living." Id. at 661-62, 275 So. 2d at 341. Pace v.
Curtis, 496 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); In re One Minor Child, 254 A.2d 443
(Del. 1969); Fleming v. Hursh, 271 Minn. 337, 136 N.W.2d 109 (1965).
45. See, e.g., James v. McLinden, 341 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (D. Conn. 1969).
''To give paramount consideration to the principle of parental priority or ownership
in custody decisions ~ould often be anathema to the best interest of the child."
Borsdorf v. Mills, 49 Ala. App. 658, 662, 275 So. 2d 338, 341 (1973). See also Ross v.
Hoffman, 33 Md. App. 333, 339, 364 A.2d 596, 600 (1976), modified on other
grounds, 372 A.2d 582 (1977). The court found that the preference of the natural
parent in custody decisions is merely a burden-placing device which puts the burden
of persuasion on the non-biological parent.
46. Bodenheimer, supra note 31, at 37-38. The author recommended that foster
parents who have cared for a child for over eighteen months be given preference
over other adoption applicants. Id. at 39. See N.Y. Soc. SERVo LAw § 383(3) (McKin
ney 1976), which gives adoption preference to the foster parents when they have had
custody of the child for two years or more.
47. Ross V. Hoffman, 33 Md. App. 333, 341-42, 364 A.2d 596, 602 (1976), mod
ified on other grounds, 372 A.2d 582 (1977). In this case, the long period of separa
tion (nine years) outweighed the rights of the natural parents to custody. The court
felt that the child was well cared for during this period and that the natural mother
had substantially abandoned her role as physical parent and therefore ordered that
custody of the child remain with the substitute parent despite the fact that the
natural mother and her new husband appeared to be fit as parents. See In re Roy, 90
Misc. 2d 35, 393 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 1977); In re S., 74 Misc. 2d
935,347 N.Y.S.2d 274 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 1973).
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liberty interest in the foster parents, the interest may be "deriva
tive, enjoyed only 'by virtue of the child's best interests being con
sidered.' "48 It is really the interest of the foster child that is at
stake in custody decisions, and it is this interest that the courts
usually seek to protect. 49 The rights said to exist in the foster par
ents thus seem to serve mostly as a means by which the interest of
the foster child can be protected. Whether the interest sought to
be protected exists in the foster parent or child, it must be given
adequate safeguards to protect the child's welfare.
B.

The Liberty Interest in the Child

There have been few cases in which courts have specifically
stated that a liberty interest exists in the foster child. As a result of
the district court decision in the instant case, which found such an
interest,50 other courts have also begun to recognize its exis
tence. 51 One court concluded that, "both the foster parents having
a close familial relationship during the first years of this child's life
and the child himself have a protectable interest under the Four
teenth Amendment which cannot be denied them without due
process of law."52 However, the number of decisions taking such a
positive view of the rights of the foster child has remained limited.
Although the courts are reluctant to expressly find a liberty
interest in the foster child which is of sufficient magnitude to be
considered a fundamental right, they reach essentially the same re
sult by applying the "best interests of the child" test as they at
tempt to resolve child custody disputes. In 1925, the New York
Court of Appeals recognized that the best interests of the child
should be the primary consideration in child custody decisions. 53
This test has grown to be the "guiding factor" in virtually all cus

48. In re Louis F., 42 N.Y.2d 260, 264, 366 N.E.2d 824, 825, 397 N.Y.S.2d 735,
736 (1977) (quoting Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 552 n.2, 356 N.E.2d 277, 285
n.2, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 829 n.2 (1976)).,
49. New York courts, for example, have determined that it is the duty of the
court to function as parens patriae and do what is best for the interests of the child.
Kurtis v. Ballou, 33 App. Div. 2d 1034, 1034,308 N.Y.S.2d 770, 771 (1970). See 111 re
5.,74 Misc. 2d 154,347 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1973).
50. See notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text.
51. OFFER v. Dumpson has been cited in several recent decisions for the
proposition that there is a liberty interest in the child deserving of due process pro
tections. See, e.g., cases cited in note 52 infra.
52. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Services, 547
F.2d 835, 857 (5th Cir. 1977). See Eason v. Welfare Comm'r, 171 Conn. 630,370 A.2d
1032 (1976) (Longo, J., dissenting).
.
53. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 434, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925).
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tody disputes. 54 Its continued use in various fOnTIS suggests that
the courts implicitly recognize certain rights in the child that may
be in the nature of a liberty interest of constitutional magnitude. 55
It has often been claimed, for example, that the child has a right to
a stable environment,56 and that the best interests are not served
by uprooting the child,57 even where the removal is only tempor
ary.58 This gives rise to a legally protected right in the child to
continue in the custody of his foster parents when he has remained
in a foster home for a significant period of time and a strong substi
tute relationship has developed. 59 One court has gone so far as to
claim that a foster child may have a "Constitutional right to freedom
from the ... [natural parent's] claim."60
Some courts have recognized that the foster child has a right
,to a pre-removal hearing to ensure that his best interests are being
protected. One court noted that when the removal of infants from
their foster parents is threatened, the right to a hearing to deter
mine the best interests is for the benefit of the innocent child and
cannot be forfeited by the foster parents. 61 It is clear that "[w ]hether
or not there exists a due process right in the foster parents which
demands a review of agency decisions, the best interests of the
child would be better served by having all interested parties heard
on the matter."62 The American Civil Liberties Union has echoed
54. Burghdoff v. Burghdoff, 66 Mich. App. 603, 611, 239 N.W.2d 679, 681
(1976)..
55. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 546, 356 N.E.2d 277, 281, 387 N.Y.S.2d
821, 825 (1976).
56. In re J., 57 App. Div. 2d 568, 568, 393 N.Y.S.2d 449, 450 (1977). The court
held that it was not in the best interests of the child to remove him from his foster
home, when that was the only home he had ever known.
57. In re Dionisio R., 81 Misc. 2d 436, 439, 366 N.Y.S.2d 280, 284 (Fam. Ct.
N.Y. County 1975). See In re S., 74 Misc. 2d 154, 347 N.Y.S.2d 470 (Fam. Ct. Kings
County 1973); Foster, Adoption and Child Custody: Best Interest of the Child?, 22
BUFFALO L. REV. 1,12-13 (1973). See also Wald, supra note 2, at 645; The Foster Par
ents Dilemma, supra note 5, at 379-80.
58. Cennami v. Dep't of Public Welfare, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 687, 694-95, 363
N.E.2d 539, 544 (1977). The court held that where an existing parental relationship
had existed for almost the entire two year life of the child, the interests of the child
demanded that a hearing be afforded. Id. at 699,363 N.E.2d at 545.
59. Id. at 700, 363 N.E.2d at 546. See also Ex rei. Larue, 366 A.2d 1271, 1287
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (Hoffman, J., dissenting); Commonwealth ex rei. Children's Aid
Society v. Card, 362 Pa. 85, 97, 66 A.2d 300, 306 (1949).
60. In re Roy, 90 Misc. 2d 35, 39, 393 N.Y.S.2d 515, 518 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County
1977). In this case an action was brought by the Social Services Agency under the
permanent neglect statute to free the child so that the foster parents could adopt him.
61. Kurtis v. Ballou, 33 App. Div. 2d 1034, 1034,308 N.Y.S.2d 770, 772 (1970).
62. The Foster Parents Dilemma, supra note 5, at 406.
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this view in arguing for the rights of the foster family to be free
from arbitrary state termination. The ACLU claims that the foster
parents and the foster child have a right to a hearing before they
can be deprived of the "psychological parent"-child relationship
that has been created. 63 In the opinion of one authority, "court[s]
cannot do 'complete justice' unless the child is recognized as a
necessary, indeed, indispensable party to the proceeding. "64
In addition to the case law, there has also been statutory rec
ognition of the need to protect the child's best interests. New York
Social Services Law § 392,65 which is at issue in the instant case,

63. [1976-77J 3 FAM. L. REp. (BNA) 2462.
64. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 65. The district court recognized the necessity
of having the interests of the child articulated at the hearing in order to have a
proper determination. OFFER v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277, 285-86 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
65.

N.Y. Soc. SERvo LAW § 392 (McKinney Supp. 1976-77) provides in perti
nent part:
2. Where a child has remained in foster care for a continuous period of
eighteen months a petition to review the foster care status of such child to
gether with a copy, if any, of the placement instrument:
(a) shall be filed in the family 'court by the authorized agency charged
with the care and custody or the guardianship and custody of such child;
(b) may be filed by another authorized agency having the supervision of
such foster care;
(c) may be filed by the foster parent or parents in whose home the child
resides or has resided during such period of eighteen months:
4. Notice of the hearing, including statement of the dispositional alterna
tives of the court, shall be given and a copy of the petition shall be served
upon the following, each of whom shall be a party entitled to participate in
the proceeding:
(a) the authorized agency charged with the care and custody or the
guardianship and custody. of such child,' if such authorized agency is not the
petitioner;
(b) the authorized agency having supervision of such foster care, if such
authorized agency is not the petitioner;
(c) the foster parent or parents in whose home the child resided or re
sides at or after the expiration of a continuous period of eighteen months in
foster care;
(d) the child's parent or guardian who transferred the care and custody
of such child temporarily to an authorized agency;
(e) a person to whom a parent entrusted the care of the child, where
such person transferred the care of the child to an authorized agency;
(f) such other persons as the court may, in its discretion, direct.
6. The court may, in its discretion, dispense with the attendance of the child
at the hearing or may, with the consent of the parties, dispense with the
hearing and make a determination based upon papers and affidavits submit
ted to the court.
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represents a legislative attempt to protect the best interests of the
child in foster care. It provides explicitly that any disposition must
be made in the best interest of the child. 66 Other jurisdictions have
also enacted statutes which recognize the need to protect the
child's interests in custody determinations involving foster care. 67
Michigan's statute sets out in detail the factors to be considered in
determining the child's best interest in such situations. 68 Despite

7. At the conclusion of such hearing, the court shall, upon the proof ad
duced, in accordance with the best interest of the child, enter an order of
disposition:
(a) directing that foster care of the child be continued;
An order of disposition entered pursuant to this subdivision shall in
clude the court's findings supporting its determination that such order is in
accordance with the best interest of the child. If the court promulgates sepa
rate findings of fact or conclusions of law, or an opinion in lieu thereof, the
order of disposition may incorporate such findings and conclusions, or opin
ions, by reference.
Analysis of the sufficiency of this procedure in the instant case may be found at
notes 76-79, 95-99 infra and accompanying text.
66. "[T]he 'best interests of the child' criteria [as provided for in section 392] is
not merely a descriptive statutory phrase, but an expression of that which must be
given overriding concern." In re L., 77 Misc. 2d 363, 367, 353 N.Y.S.2d 317, 324
(Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 1974).
67. See;e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.64(1) (West Supp. 1977-78).
68. MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 722.23 (West Supp. 1977-78):
722.23 Best interests of the child, definition
Sec. 3 "Best interests of the child" means the sum total of the following fac
tors to be considered, evaluated and determined by the court:
(a) The love, affection and other emotional ties existing between the
competing parties and the child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of competing parties to give the child
love, affection and guidance and continuation of the educating and raising of
the child in its religion or creed, if any.
(c) The capacity and disposition of competing parties to provide the
child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized
and permitted under the laws of this state in lieu of medical care, and other
material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory envi
ronment and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custo
dial home.
(f) The moral fitness of the competing parties.
(g) The mental and physical health of the competing parties.
(h) The home, school and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child
to be of sufficient age to express preference.
(j) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular
child custody dispute.
See generally Doe v. Mitchell, 397 Mich. 225, 244 N.W.2d 827 (1976).
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increasing recognition of the importance of adhering to the "best
interests of the child" standard, the majority of states have not yet
enacted laws which so thoroughly attempt to protect the interest of
the child. However, statutory provisions which have been adopted
make it clear that the interests of the child are of paramount im
portance. They support the conclusion that there is a liberty in
terest in the child which 'must be accorded due process safeguards.
IV.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE NEW YORK REMOVAL PROCEDURES

In the instant case, the district court, in striking down the New
York procedures, stressed the need for a pre-removal hearing. 69
The court reasoned that "[aJ hearing dispels the appearance and
minimizes the possibility of arbitrary or misinformed action. . . .
This is especially true for children such as these who have already
undergone the emotionally scarring experience of being removed
from the home of their natural parents. "70 The pre-removal confer
ence provided for by section 450.1471 was held to be inadequate as
a data-gathering device because the foster parents are not permit
ted to present evidence or witnesses, the public official involved is
not necessarily a neutral observer of the situation, and the foster
child is not permitted to participate. 72 The court viewed the post
removal hearing provided for by Social Services Law § 40073 as
inadequate. 74 It was "at the least, paradoxical to suggest that a hear
ing designed to forestall the hasty and ill-advised separation of a
foster child from his foster home can occur after that separation has
already taken place. "75
The court also found New York Social Services Law § 392,
which provides for a pre-removal judicial hearing at the request of
the foster parents,76 to be defective, in that: 1) The statute offers no
69. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
70. OFFER v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277, 282-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (citation
omitted).
:
71. See note 13 supra.
72. 418 F. Supp. at 283.
73. See note 12 supra.
74. The Supreme Court has held that for a hearing to comply with due process,
it must be held at a meaningful time, place, and manner and must occur before de
privation of an interest, except in extraordinary circumstances. Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971). The Court has also noted that what is considered mean
ingful depends on the nature of the case. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971)
(citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950));
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970).
75. 418 F. Supp. at 284.
76. See note 65 supra.
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benefits to a child who has been in foster care for less than eight
een months;77 2) the family court does not have the power under
the statute to order the child to remain in a specified foster
home; 7S and 3) there is no provision for invoking this section if
removal is not brought to the attention of the court by the foster
parents. In supporting this finding the court reasoned that the right
to a hearing for the benefit of the child should not be made to
"depend upon the initiative of third persons," because of the over
riding importance of protecting the foster child. 79
The district court also noted a recent New York City proce
dure, so which at the request of the foster parents provides for "a
pre-removal 'independent review' conducted 'in accordance with
the concepts of due process.' "S1 The court found even this proce
dure inadequate to afford foster children the full protection neces
sary in that it is only available upon request of the foster parents, it
does not apply in instances where the child is to be returned to his
natural parents, and it does not allow the child and the biological
parent to participate, all of which limits the effectiveness of the
hearing. s2
77. 418 F. Supp. at 284. The district court called for protection whenever a
child is in foster care for one year or more. Id. at 282.
78. Id. at 284. The court based this finding on the opinion in In re W., 77 Misc.
2d 374, 376, 355 N.Y.S.2d 245, 248 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 1974) (where it was de
termined that in a § 392 proceeding, the foster parents cannot receive a temporary
disposition in their favor). But see Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816, 832 n.32 (1977)
(the Supreme Court indicated that the family court did in fact order the child to re
main in the same foster home).
79. 418 F. Supp. at 285.
80. Its salient features, as set forth in an internal memorandum of August 5,
1974, are as follows:
(1) the review is heard before a supervisory official who has had no previous
involvement with the decision to remove the child; (2) both the foster par
ents and the agency may be represented by counsel and each may present
witnesses and evidence; (3) all witnesses must be sworn, unless stipulated
otherwise, and all testimony is subject to cross-examination, (4) counsel for
the foster parents must be allowed to examine any portion of the agency's
files used to support the proposal to remove the child; (5) either a tape re
cording or stenographic record of the hearing must be kept and made avail
able to the parties at cost; and (6) a written decision, supported by reasons,
must be rendered within five days and must include a reminder to the foster
parents that they may still request a post-removal hearing under N.Y.C.R.R.
Section 450.14.
418 F. Supp. at 285.
81. 418 F. Supp. at 285. This procedure offers a pre-removal hearing only in
New York City; no such hearing is provided throughout the rest of the state. Id. at
232 n.13.
82. 418 F. Supp. at 285.
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The district court concluded that the New York statutes, "as
presently operated, unduly infringe the constitutional rights of fos
ter children, "83 but did not specifically describe standards that
would be constitutionally sufficient. However, the court did indi
cate that minimum standards should require: 1) That an automatic
hearing be held before the removal of any child who has been in
foster care for more than one year; 2) that the hearing be before
some neutral officer who has the authority to order continued
placement of the child with their foster parents; 3) that all parties,
including the agency, the natural parents, the foster parents, and
the child or the representative appointed to protect his interest be
represented; and 4) that all parties be permitted to introduce any
relevant evidence. The court concluded that the present New York
procedures did not satisfY these minimum requirements and were
therefore insufficient to adequately protect the interests involved.
On appeal, the Supreme Court measured the sufficiency of the
New York procedures by ostensibly using the test it had recently
set forth in Matthews v. Eldridge. 84 There the Court sought to
balance the private interest affected, the risk of erroneous depriva
tion of such an interest,85 and the probable value of additional
safeguards against the fiscal and administrative burdens of provid
ing the additional safeguards. 86 Using this test,87 the Court found
that the district court's proposal for automatic agency review of
child placement in every case where removal is sought was un
necessary. In the Court's view if the foster parents do not care
enough to request a hearing as provided, the emotional attach
ments are not significant enough to be worth protecting. 88 The

83. Id. at 286.
84. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). In this case an action was brought challenging the
validity of administrative procedures for the termination of social security disability
benefits. The Court held that a prior evidentiary hearing was not required and that
the termination procedures fully complied with due process.
85. "[T]he possible length of wrongful deprivation ... is an important factor in
assessing the impact of official action on the private interests." Fusari v. Steinberg,
419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975).
86. "While the problem of additional expense must be kept in mind, it does not
justify denying a hearing meeting the ordinary standards of due process." Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 901
(S.D.N.Y. 1968».
87. 431 U.S. 848-51.
88. The Supreme Court noted that since the institution of the New York City
procedure, which provides for a pre-removal agency hearing at the request of the
foster parents, there had been approximately 5,600 transfers but only 26 foster pa
rents requested hearings. Id. at 851.
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Court therefore reasoned that the administrative burden on the
state to provide for automatic review would be too great. 89
It is unrealistic to assume that because the foster parent does
not request a hearing, no significant emotional attachments exist in
the foster family. This view ignores the possibility that the child
might substantially benefit from an unrequested hearing. It is cer
tainly possible that a significant number of foster parents may be
unaware of their right to a hearing. In addition, it has been estab
lished that if an interest is worthy of substantial protections, then
administrative burdens alone are not reason enough to deny due
process p~otections. 90
The Supreme Court found that the child and biological parents
are not necessary parties to the hearing, and further pointed out
that there is nothing in the procedures that would prevent them
from taking part in the proceeding if it became apparent that their
presence would be valuable. 91 This observation is accurate, but it
is likely that the child's best interests would be better served by
requiring their participation. This would increase the chances of
gathering all relevant data necessary to an accurate and construc
tive determination.
The Supreme Court also rejected the district court's conten
tion that the New York City rule 92 is inadequate in that it does not
apply to the removal of a child who is to be returned to his natural
parents. The Court asserted that different interests must be bal
anced in this situation, and that the foster parents' rights must be
severely limited where they compete against the rights of the
natural parents.93 However, this reasoning fails to recognize the
benefits that a full hearing would provide regardless of whether or
not the child is to be returned to his natural parents. 94
Finally, the Supreme Court attacked the district court's find
ings as to section 392,95 determining that: 1) The eighteen month
minimum period before which review is possible is not inadequate
in that the district court's proposal for a twelve month limit had not
been established as being a more accurate indication of the time in
89. Id.
90. See note 86 supra.
91. 431 U.S. at 851-52.
92. See note 80 supra.
93. 431 U.S. at 853.
94. See note 33 supra and accompanying text. A fuJI hearing should increase
the chances of a proper determination. The effect of such a hearing should not be
detrimental to the interests of the natural parents unless their conduct warrants such
action in promoting the best interests of the child.
95. See note 65 supra.
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which emotional bonds have formed;96 2) New York judicial in
terpretation of the statute permits an order requiring the child to
be left in the same foster home, contrary to the district court's
assertion;97 3) the procedure need not provide automatic review in
every case. 98 The Court concluded that since the section 392 rem
edy was constitutionally sufficient to protect
whatever liberty interest might exist in the continued existence
of the foster family when the State seeks to transfer the child to
another foster home, a fortiori the procedure is adequate to pro
tect the lesser interest of the foster family in remaining together
at the expense of the disruption of the natural family. 99

It is curious that the Court reached its holding without fixing
the magnitude of the liberty interest in the foster family. The
amount of protection necessary to comply with due process should
depend on the nature and strength of that interest. 100 Therefore
the logical approach would have been to precisely classify the
interest involved before attempting to determine what process is
due. The Court's approach is especially difficult to justify in light of
the majority's express recognition that a liberty interest does exist
in the foster family. 101
Although the Court stated that it was applying the Matthews
test,102 it did not actually follow it. If the Court had applied the
test strictly, it would have concluded that the nature of the interest
involved is so important, and the possible harm that could result
from the use of inadequate procedures to protect that interest so
great,103 that the administrative burdens of providing for automatic
hearings should not be permitted to outweigh the benefit to the
child, the foster family, and society.1 04 This reluctance on the part
96. The Supreme Court saw no justification for the district court to substitute
its view for that of the New York Legislature. Any line drawn is likely to be some
what arbitrary, giving protection to families where no bonds have formed while fail
ing to protect relationships in other families that have developed quickly. 431 U.S. at
854.
97. [d. See note 78 supra.
98. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
99. 431 U.S. at 855.
100. "[C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under any
given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of
the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been af
fected by government action." Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
101. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
102. See notes 84-88 supra and accompanying text.
103. OFFER v. Dumpson, 418 F. Supp. 277, 284 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
104. Society has an important stake in seeing that children grow up in an envi
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of the Court to strike down the New York provisions despite rec
ognition of the existence of a liberty interest may be explained by
the Court's admitted hesitancy to go too far when dealing "with
issues of unusual delicacy, in an area where professional judgments
regarding desirable procedures are constantly and rapidly chang
ing. "105 This position leaves the lower courts with the responsibil
ity for determining the sufficiency of the removal procedures in
their respective states.

V.

SUMMARY

Under our present foster care system, long-term placements of
foster children with a single foster family are commonplace. This
situation has inevitably led to the creation of strong emotional at
tachments within the foster family. Because of these attachments,
great psychological harm could come to the child if he is forcibly
separated from his foster family. It is clear that there must be some
protection for the child and possibly the foster parents to prevent
an arbitrary and destqJctive separation.
To provide protection for the child when his custody or place
ment is in question, the "best interests of the child" test was de
veloped by the courts and subsequently adopted by various legis
latures. This test implicitly recognizes that a child has a right to be
protected from being forced to grow up in an environment which
may be dangerous to his welfare. The child must be permitted to
remain in a stable environment where strong family ties exist, re
gardless of whether the family is biological, adoptive, or foster in
nature. In recent years, the courts have recognized and expanded
the rights of the child to ensure that the best interests of the child
will be served. In so doing, they have created a liberty interest in
the child of substantial weight, that demands appropriate constitu
tional protections.
Courts have also recognized that a liberty interest exists in the
foster parents, even though in reality they are usually acting to
protect the interests of the child. Providing for such an interest in
the foster parents may be a useful way to ensure that the foster
child's best interests are being promoted. Regardless of whether
the liberty interest is viewed as existing in the foster parent, foster
ronment that will help them to develop into productive adults. Studies have revealed
~hat placement in foster care has resulted in significant improvement in the chil
dren's well-being with respect to their physical health, behavior control, ability to
cope in school, and peer relations. Wald, supra note 2, at 646-47. Continuation in
an environment which has produced such positive results should eventually have a
beneficial effect on society at large.
105. 431 U.S. at 855.
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child, foster family, or any combination of the three, it is clear that
the interest increases with the length of time a child spends' in a
single foster home. The interest may also be stronger in situations
where the removal precedes a transfer to another foster home as
opposed to a return to his natural or adoptive parents. Whatever
the circumstances, this interest should never be regarded as insig
nificant or unworthy of basic protections. Rather, it should be
given overriding concern in determining what should be done with
the child.
.
In upholding the validity of the New York statutes the Su
preme Court must have realized that such procedures afforded a
great deal of protection to the foster family in removal situations
when compared with protections available in other jurisdictions. To
strike down such a statutory scheme would have forced the Court
to define the minimum standards necessary to protect the interests
in the foster family. The Court's reluctance to forward such a defi
nition leaves the issue open to interpretation by the lower courts.
It is probable that the near future will bring increased litigation in
jurisdictions which are not as progressive as New York in this area
of the law.
VI. CONCLUSION
A liberty interest must be recognized in the foster family which
is of such magnitude as to require that certain procedural safeguards
be satisfied before a foster child may be removed from the family.
First, and most importantly, the removal hearing should require the
presence of all parties who may have information relevant to the dis
position. In addition, cross-examination of the parties should be pro
vided for so that all relevant information may become available to the
fact-finder who must make the ultimate determination. The in
creased administrative burdens cannot be viewed as too great, in
light of the nature of the interest involved. The interests of the child
should be the overriding concern because of the potential harm
that may be caused by a misinformed determination. It is only
when all relevant information is gathered and analyzed that the
child can be adequately protected. Due to the extreme importance
of the child's interest, these minimum procedures should be re
quired in all circumstances, except when the state must act sum
marily in emergency situations. 106

David Ian Schoen
106. This exception was recognized by the district court as a necessary means
of protecting the child where his welfare is immediately threatened. 418 F. Supp. at
286.

